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Abstract
In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for
the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen’s with
positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project’s provision. In this work, we present
novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative
valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a method-
ology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative
valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN
and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on
their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief
Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we pro-
pose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We
leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents
with greater belief towards the project’s provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief.
Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Crowdfunding is a process of raising funds from a large pool of interested agents and is an active area
of research [1, 2, 6, 17, 16]. The process, when applied for the provision of public projects, is called
civic crowdfunding. In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has grown to be instrumental in providing
a platform through which citizens can collectively finance social initiatives such as libraries, public
parks, etc.
In the standard approach for civic crowdfunding, the social planner uses the voluntary contri-
bution mechanism with a provision point, the provision point mechanism ([3]). The social planner
sets up a target amount, referred to as the provision point, to be raised. If the contributions by
the agents exceed the provision point, social planner provisions the project; otherwise, returns the
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contributions. The mechanism, however, has been shown to have several inefficient equilibria [3, 4,
14].
Provision Point mechanism with Refund bonus (PPR) by [20] introduces an additional refund
bonus to be paid to all the contributing agents (along with their contribution) in case the project
is not provisioned. Chandra et. al. [5] showed that in sequential setting, wherein the history of
contributions is known to the agents, PPR collapses to a simultaneous move game, among the
contributing agents. Towards this, they proposed Provision Point mechanism with Securities (PPS)
with refunds based on complex prediction markets, and showed that it induces a sequential game,
in which the project is provisioned at equilibrium. Thus in this paper, for a sequential game, we
focus on PPS while focusing on PPR for a simultaneous game. To the best of our knowledge, there
are no other refund bonus mechanisms for civic crowdfunding.
Note that in all these mechanisms only those agents with a positive valuation towards the project
contribute to its provision. However, several agents may prefer the project to not be provisioned,
i.e., their valuation may be negative for the project getting provisioned. For instance, consider
the construction of a garbage dump yard in a locality. While the project may be welcomed by a
number of agents, a certain set of agents may wish to relocate the project from its current location
to another. In other words, these agents may not prefer the construction of the dump yard – in
the locality proposed. In such a scenario, the construction of the dump yard (as well as the locality
in which it is constructed) must depend on the majority’s opinion of it. The civic crowdfunding
literature does not address such negative valuation. If addressed, civic crowdfunding with agents
with negative valuation can provide a natural way for preference aggregation.
We define an agent’s information structure as consisting of its valuation and its belief towards
the project’s provision. Based on their valuation, we categorize these agents as follows: positive
(negative) agents i.e., agents with positive (negative) valuation or positive (negative) preference
towards the project’s provision. The mechanisms, mentioned above, also assume that apart from
knowing the history of contributions, agents do not have any information regarding the provision of
the project, i.e., every agent’s belief is symmetric towards the project’s provision.
Motivated to break these barriers on an agent’s information structure in existing literature for
civic crowdfunding, in this paper, we address these two limitations by (i) handling symmetric
agents with negative preference and (ii) handling positive agents with asymmetric belief towards
the project’s provision, independently. Relaxing both the assumptions in one mechanism is still
illusive.
To incorporate civic crowdfunding for agents with negative valuation, we require mechanisms
that integrate negative agents. For this, we set up two parallel markets, with two different targets
– one for the provision, i.e., provision point and one against the provision, i.e., rejection point, for
the project. The project is provisioned (not provisioned) if the provision (rejection) point is reached
first. A strategic agent may choose to contribute in a market, against its preference. Thus, the
challenge in such a setting remains to ingeniously design a refund scheme such that the agents are
incentivized to contribute based on their preference. For this, we propose a methodology through
which existing mechanisms for positive preferences also allow for agents with negative preferences,
such that agents contribute to the market based on their true preference. In particular, we adapt
existing PPR and PPS mechanisms to design PPRN and PPSN mechanisms. We prove that in these
mechanisms at equilibrium, either the provision point or the rejection point holds.
Further, designing mechanisms for civic crowdfunding for agents with asymmetric beliefs is not
trivial. For instance, a rational agent with significant belief towards the project’s provision may
choose to free-ride, as it believes that the project will be provisioned regardless of its contribution.
Such asymmetric agents need to be further incentivized to contribute towards the project’s provision.
For this, we propose a novel reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) that rewards an agent
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based on their belief towards the project’s provision. We deploy a peer prediction mechanism for
information aggregation of each agent’s belief. With BBR, we propose a novel class of mechanisms
for civic crowdfunding which incentivizes agents with asymmetric beliefs to contribute towards the
provision, such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the required preliminaries. We begin by defining our crowdfunding model.
2.1 Model
For the civic crowdfunding of public project PP , the Project Maker (PM), sets up a market for
its provision. The PM announces a provision point h0 as the target to be reached until a deadline
T . Let A = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all agents wherein each Agent i has valuation θi ≥ 0 if PP
gets provisioned. The agents contribute x = (x1, . . . , xn) to the crowdfunding mechanism. Let
ϑ =
∑i=n
i=1 θi; the total valuation of all the agents and X =
∑i=n
i=1 xi; the sum of the contributions.
A project is provisioned if X ≥ h0 at the end of deadline T and not provisioned otherwise. Such
mechanisms are referred to as provision point mechanisms. Note that θis are private to the agents
and provision point mechanisms are indirect mechanisms to aggregate these. This setup induces a
game amongst the agents.
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be the vector of strategy profile of every agent. Agent i’s strategy consists
of its contribution xi towards the project’s provision along with other mechanism dependent param-
eters. We use the subscript −i to represent vectors without Agent i. The utility for Agent i with
valuation θi for the project, when all the agents play the strategy profile σ is ui(σ; θi).
We now define some important game-theoretic definitions necessary for the analysis of the mech-
anisms presented in this paper.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)). A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is said to be a Nash
equilibrium (NE) if for every Agent i, it maximizes the utility ui(σ
∗; θi) i.e., ∀i ∈ A,
ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i; θi) ≥ ui(σi, σ
∗
−i; θi) ∀σi, ∀θi.
For crowdfunding in sequential setting, i.e., when the contributing agents arrive over time, the
strategy profile of every Agent i also constitutes the time ti at which it contributes to the mechanism.
Let, ai be the time at which Agent i arrives to the mechanism. Further, let h
0
t denote the amount
remaining for the project to be provisioned at time t. With this, we define,
Definition 2 (Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)). A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is said
to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium if for every Agent i, it maximizes the utility ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i|Hai ; θi)
i.e., ∀i ∈ A,
ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i|Hai ; θi) ≥ ui(σi, σ
∗
−i|Hai ; θi) ∀σi, ∀H
t, ∀θi.
Here, Ht is the history of the game till time t, constituting the agents’ arrivals and their contri-
butions and σ∗−i|Hai indicates that the players who arrive after ai follow the strategy specified by
σ∗−i.
In the next subsection we describe existing mechanisms in the literature for civic crowdfunding.
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2.2 Provision Point Mechanisms
In this paper, we focus on the class of mechanisms for civic crowdfunding which require the project
to aggregate a minimum level (Provision Point of the project) of funding before the PM can claim
it. Several provision point mechanisms for civic crowdfunding have been proposed [4, 9, 3, 14, 18,
7, 6]; but our work focuses on PPR [20] and PPS [5] mechanisms.
2.2.1 Provision Point Mechanism with Refund (PPR)
To counter the problem of free-riding, PPR offers a refund bonus to the agents in case the project
does not get provisioned. The refund bonus scheme is directly proportional to agent’s contribution.
Let IX be an indicator random variable which takes the value 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise. Then
the utility structure of PPR, for each agent i ∈ A is given as,
ui = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi) + IX<h0 ·
(xi
X
)
B,
where B is the total budget kept aside by the PM, and is distributed to the agents who contributed
along with their contribution, as a refund, in case the project is not provisioned.
The refund bonus in PPR is independent of time of contribution and therefore all agents delay
their contributions as close to the deadline as possible and wait to free-ride till the end. Such
strategies lead to the project not getting provisioned in practice and are therefore undesirable.
2.2.2 Provision Point Mechanism with Securities (PPS)
PPS addresses the shortcomings of PPR by offering agents refunds based on the time of their contri-
bution. An early contributor is paid higher refund than a late contributor for the same contribution.
The utility structure of PPS, for each agent i ∈ A is given as,
ui = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi) + IX<h0 · (r
ti
i − xi),
where, ti and r
ti
i are Agent i’s time of contribution and the number of securities allocated to it,
respectively. rtii depends on its contribution xi at ti, as well as the total number of securities issued
in the market at time ti, denoted by q
ti , i.e. [5, Eq. 6],
rtii = C
−1
0
(
xi + C0(q
ti)
)
− qti .
Here, C0 is the cost function governing the underlying prediction market in PPS obtained from
the general cost function C, by fixing the number of positive outcome securities. A cost function
must satisfy [5, CONDITIONS 1-4,6] to be used in PPS. The properties of the cost function, C0,
relevant to this paper include:
1. rtii is an increasing function of xi, i.e.,
∂r
ti
i
xi
> 1, ∀θ < h0 [5, CONDITION-7].
2. rti is a decreasing function of ti [5, Step-2 (Theorem 3)].
The existing literature for civic crowdfunding is limited through its assumptions on the informa-
tion structure of the contributing agents. We define an agent’s information structure as consisting
of its valuation and its belief towards the project’s provision. Based on their valuation, we catego-
rize agents as follows: positive (negative) agent i.e., Agent i with θi ≥ 0 (θi < 0) or with positive
(negative) preference towards PP ’s provision. Let P (N) denote the set of all positive (negative)
agents, such that A = P ∪ N. Further, let ϑ1 =
∑
i θi ∀i ∈ P as the total valuation for PP getting
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provisioned and ϑ2 =
∑
i (−θi) ∀i ∈ N as the total valuation for PP not getting provisioned, i.e.,
ϑ = ϑ1−ϑ2. For preference aggregation, the PM’s goal is to determine whether the majority prefers
PP to be provisioned or not, i.e., whether or not ϑ ≥ 0.
We also consider agents with asymmetric beliefs towards PP ’s provision i.e., agents may believe
that the project may be provisioned with probability (belief) 1/2± ǫ or may not be provisioned with
probability 1/2 ∓ ǫ for some ǫ ≥ 0. Let k1i = (1/2 + ǫi) and k
2
i = (1/2 − ǫi) for some ǫi ≥ 0 such
that k1i + k
2
i = 1, ∀i ∈ A. Let A
+ (A−) be the set of agents which believe that PP will (will not) be
provisioned i.e., every agent i ∈ A+ (i ∈ A−) has belief k1i (k
2
i ) that PP will be provisioned, such
that A = A+ ∪ A−.
In this paper, we require each agent to truthfully elicit its belief regarding the provision of the
public project. Since an agent’s opinion (belief) is its private information, we look for mechanisms
which incentivize it to elicit its true opinion. In mechanism design theory, such mechanisms are
called incentive compatible (IC). Further, these mechanisms must also be individually rational (ID)
i.e., each Agent i must have non-negative utility. Towards this, we make use of peer prediction
mechanisms.
2.3 Peer Prediction Mechanisms
Peer prediction mechanisms (PPM) allow for elicitation and aggregation of subjective opinions from
a set of agents. These are generally deployed in situations where there is no method of verifying an
agent’s honesty (of their opinion) or their ability. In the literature, there are a number of existing
peer prediction mechanisms [12, 10, 11, 8, 13].
For illustrative purposes, in this paper, we focus on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS)
mechanism ([19]).
2.3.1 Robust Bayesian Truth Serum
While RBTS mechanism properties hold for an arbitrary number of signals, we present the binary
version of the mechanism, since we are interested in the elicitation of an agent’s belief towards the
provision of the project. In RBTS, each agent is required to submit, from [19]:
1. Information Report: Let fi = {0, 1} be Agent i’s reported signal.
2. Prediction Report: Let gi ∈ [0, 1] be Agent i’s report about the frequency of high signals
among the citizens.
Based on information report and prediction report, RBTS assigns a score to each agent. The
mechanism, for each Agent i, selects a reference agent j = i + 1 (modulo n) and a peer agent
k = i+ 2 (modulo n) and calculates,
g′i =
{
gj + δ if fi = 1
gj − δ if fi = 0
where δ = min(gj , 1− gj). Then, the RBTS score for Agent i is given by,
RBTSi = Gm(g
′
i, fk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information score
+ Gm(gi, fk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prediction score
. (1)
Gm(·) is the binary quadratic scoring rule [15] normalized to give scores between 0 and 1 and is
a strictly proper scoring rule.
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RBTS mechanism is IC and ex-post ID ([19, Theorem 10]) for the elicitation of binary information
for all n ≥ 3, without relying on knowledge of the common prior. Note that many other peer
prediction mechanisms are IC only when n→∞ and hence we chose RBTS.
3 Civic Crowdfunding for Agents With Negative Valuations
In this section, we introduce a methodology through which civic crowdfunding mechanisms can
incorporate symmetric agents with negative preference (valuation) towards the public project’s pro-
vision. For this, the PM sets up two separate markets, i.e., one for the provision and one against the
provision of the project. Thus, agents now have a greater scope for manipulation. In such a setting,
a strategic agent may choose to contribute in a market, against its preference, if its expected utility
for contributing in that market is more than if it contributes in the market based on its preference.
Therefore, to incorporate agents with negative preference, we must ingeniously construct the refund
scheme in a way so that the agents are incentivized to contribute in the market based on their true
preference.
To illustrate this methodology, we provide two mechanisms for the same by adopting existing
mechanisms in PPR and PPS; as namely, PPRN and PPSN. For these mechanisms, let h1 (h2) be the
target for provision (rejection) of PP with X 1 (X 2) as the total funding received towards (against)
its provision. Further, let h1t (h
2
t ) denote the amount remaining for the project to be provisioned
(not provisioned) at time t.
We now present Provision Point Mechanism with Refund for Negative Preference (PPRN) lever-
aging PPR.
3.1 Provision Point Mechanism with Refunds with Negative Preference
(PPRN)
We now propose a mechanism for civic crowdfunding for agents with negative valuation by leveraging
PPR, namely PPRN.
3.1.1 Protocol
In PPRN, Agent i not only contributes its contribution xi but also specifies its preference i.e.,
whether it wants to contribute towards the project getting provisioned or not getting provisioned.
Let si ∈ {1, 2}, ∀i ∈ A be a private preference variable for Agent i, such that si = 1, ∀i ∈ P and
si = 2, ∀i ∈ N. Further, let Agent i’s reported preference be s˜i. PM adds Agent i’s contribution
towards the project’s provision or rejection based on its reported preference s˜i. The project is
provisioned or not based on whichever target is first reached.
3.1.2 Agent Utility
The utility for Agent i ∈ A with s˜i = 1 in PPRN is as follows,
ui(·) = IX 1≥h1 · (θi − xi) + IX 1<h1 ·
(
xi
X 1 + X 2
)
B (PPRN-U1)
Similarly, the utility for Agent i ∈ A with s˜i = 2 in PPRN is as follows,
ui(·) = IX 2≥h2 · (−xi) + IX 2<h2 ·
(
θi +
(
xi
X 1 + X 2
)
B
)
(PPRN-U2)
6
3.1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now provide the equilibrium analysis for PPRN as the following theorem,
Theorem 1. For PPRN, with the utility as given by Eq. PPRN-U1 and Eq. PPRN-U2 ∀i ∈ A,
which satisfies 0 < B < (h
1+h2)(ϑ1−h1)
h1
, 0 < B < (h
1+h2)(ϑ2−h2)
h2
, ϑ1 > h1 and ϑ2 > h2, a set of
strategies σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
∗
i , s˜i),
σ∗i =
{
(0, T, si) if ∃ l s.t. h
l
T = 0, else,
(x∗i , T, si) : x
∗
i <
(
h1+h2
B+h1+h2
)
|θi|
∀l ∈ {1, 2}; form a set of equilibrium strategies ∀i ∈ A, such that at equilibrium either X 1 =
h1 or X 2 = h2 holds.
Proof. In Step 1, we show that the equilibrium contributions are such that at equilibrium either
X 1 = h1 or X 2 = h2 holds. Step 2 shows that each agent delays its contribution till the deadline
T . We prove that every agent contributes based on its true preference in Step 3. Step 4 calculates
the equilibrium contribution of every agent. Finally, in Step 5 we give the conditions for existence
of Nash Equilibrium.
Step 1 : As ϑ1 > h1 and ϑ2 > h2, at equilibrium X 1 < h1 and X 2 < h2 cannot hold, as ∃i ∈
P and ∃j ∈ N with xi < θi and xj < |θj |, at least, that could obtain a higher refund bonus
by marginally increasing its contribution because of B > 0. Likewise, any agent with a positive
contribution could gain in utility by marginally decreasing its contribution if X 1 > h1 or X 2 > h2.
Thus, at equilibrium, either X 1 = h1 or X 2 = h2 holds.
Step 2 : As the refund in PPRN is independent of time, no agent has any incentive to contribute
early. Thus, each agent delays its contribution till the deadline, T .
Step 3 : Since every Agent i is symmetric in its belief towards the project’s provision, its expected
utility is given by 12
(
θi − xi +
xi
X 1+X 2B
)
. Thus, every Agent i has no incentive to deviate from its
preference. Thus, s˜i = si, ∀i ∈ A.
Step 4 :
1. For Positive agents: At equilibrium, the best response for an Agent i ∈ P is that contribution
x∗i such that its provisioned utility is not less than not provisioned utility since it prefers the
project to be provisioned and is symmetric in its belief, i.e., ∀i ∈ P,
θi − x
∗
i ≥
(
x∗i
X 1 + X 2
)
B
⇒ x∗i ≤
(
(X 1 + X 2)
B + X 1 + X 2
)
θi <
(
h1 + h2
B + h1 + h2
)
θi,
Last inequality follows from the fact that X 1 + X 2 < h1 + h2.
2. For Negative agents: The best response for an Agent i ∈ N is that equilibrium contribution x∗i
such that its not provisioned utility is not less than provisioned utility since the agent prefers
the project to not be provisioned and is symmetric in its belief, i.e., ∀i ∈ N,
|θi|+
(
x∗i
X 1 + X 2
)
B ≤ −x∗i
⇒ x∗i ≤
(
(X 1 + X 2)
B + X 1 + X 2
)
|θi| <
(
h1 + h2
B + h1 + h2
)
|θi|
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Step 5 : Summing up x∗i , ∀i ∈ P gives the condition for existence of Nash Equilibrium as,
0 < B <
(h1 + h2)(ϑ1 − h1)
h1
.
Similarly, summing up x∗i , ∀i ∈ N,
0 < B <
(h1 + h2)(ϑ2 − h2)
h2
.
gives the condition for existence of Nash Equilibrium.
In the next subsection, we present Provision Point Mechanism for Securities with Negative Pref-
erence (PPSN) by leveraging PPS.
3.2 Provision Point Mechanism for Securities with Negative Preference
(PPSN)
We now propose a mechanism for civic crowdfunding for agents with negative valuation by leveraging
PPS, namely PPSN.
3.2.1 Protocol
In PPSN, we consider a mechanism with two independent PPS prediction markets - PPS1 and PPS2.
In PPS1, agents contribute for the project to be provisioned (and buy negative securities) while in
PPS2, agents contribute for the project to not be provisioned (and buy positive securities). Note
that the markets being independent, the prices in both the markets are also independent of the other.
Provision point for PPS1 is reached when the total contribution in it reaches h1, and rejection point
for PPS2 when the total contribution in it reaches h2. Let, X 1 be the total contribution received by
the project in PPS1 and X 2 be the total contribution received by the project in PPS2. The project
is provisioned or not based on whichever target is first reached.
Let si ∈ {1, 2}, be a private preference variable for Agent i, such that si = 1, ∀i ∈ P and
si = 2, ∀i ∈ N.
3.2.2 Common Refund Scheme
An agent may not contribute in the market based on its preference if its expected refund is more in
case it contributes in the other market. To prevent this, we present a common refund scheme that
ensures that the agent obtains same refund in spite of which market it chooses to contribute. In
this, Agent i contributes xi in any market based on a refund that depends on the minimum of the
issued securities present in both the markets i.e., Qti = min(qtiPPS1, q
ti
PPS2). Based on this, Agent i
is issued securities (Rtii ) for a contribution xi given by
Rtii = C
−1
0 (xi + C0(Q
ti))−Qti ,
from [5, Eq. 6]. Thus, Agent i’s refund in this scheme is Rtii − xi.
However, the number of issued securities only changes for the market in which the agent con-
tributes xi to, i.e.,
C−10 (xi + C0(q
t
PPS(si)
))− qtPPS(si),
will be the change in the total number of issued securities in the market PPS(si).
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Proposition 1. The securities allotted to an agent with total issued securities as Qt is always
greater than or equal to those it would have received with securities qtPPS1 or q
t
PPS2 for the same
contribution and the same cost function C0.
Proof. The statement follows directly from the fact that the number of securities allotted, for the
same contribution, is a decreasing function of the total issued securities [5, Step-2 (Theorem 3)].
Proposition 2. The refund given by Rtii − xi for Agent i, is a decreasing function with respect to
time ti.
Proof. The securities allotted to Agent i, Rtii , decreases as Q
ti increases (Proposition 1). Further,
since Qt = min(qtPPS1, q
t
PPS2) and q
t
PPS1 and q
t
PPS2 are non-decreasing with respect to time t; Q
t
is a non-decreasing function of time. Thus, Rtii −xi for Agent i, is a decreasing function with respect
to time ti.
Let us call PPS1 as p1, and PPS2 as p2. Thus, psi = p1, ∀i ∈ P and psi = p2, ∀i ∈ N. Further,
let the market in which Agent i contributes be p˜si .
3.2.3 Agent Utility
The utility for Agent i ∈ A with p˜si = p1, in PPSN is as follows,
ui(·) = IX 1≥h1 · (θi − xi) + IX 1<h1 · (Ri − xi) (PPSN-U1)
The utility for Agent i ∈ A with p˜si = p2, in PPSN is as follows,
ui(·) = IX 2≥h2 · (−xi) + IX 2<h2 · (θi +Ri − xi) (PPSN-U2)
3.2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We now provide the equilibrium analysis of this mechanism as the following theorem,
Theorem 2. For PPSN, with the utility as given by Eq. PPSN-U1 and Eq. PPSN-U2 ∀i ∈ A,
C : R2 → R as the cost function, C10 : R → R as the cost function obtained from C by fixing
the number positive outcome securities satisfying [5, CONDITION 7] and used in the market p1
satisfying (C10 )
−1(h1 + C0(0)) < ϑ
1, and C20 : R → R as the cost function obtained from C by
fixing the number of negative outcome securities satisfying1 [5, CONDITION 7] and used in the
market p2 satisfying C
−1
0 (h
2 +C0(0)) < ϑ
2, with ϑ1 > h1 and ϑ2 > h2, a set of strategies in the set
σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
∗
i , p˜si),
σ∗i =
{
(0, ai, psi) if ∃ l s.t. h
l
ai
= 0, else,
(x∗i , ai, psi) : x
∗
i ≤ C0(|θi|+Q
ai)− C0(Q
ai)
∀l ∈ {1, 2}; are sub-game perfect equilibria ∀i ∈ A, such that at equilibrium either X 1 = h1 or X 2 =
h2 holds.
Proof. In Step 1, we show that the equilibrium contributions are such that at equilibrium either
X 1 = h1 or X 2 = h2 holds. We prove that every agent contributes based on its true preference
in Step 2. Step 3 calculates the equilibrium contribution of every agent. In Step 4 we give the
conditions for existence of Nash Equilibrium. We show that these set of strategies are sub-game
perfect in Step 5.
1It is trivial to see that both the cost functions shall be the same. Hence, from hereon we will refer to both of
them without the superscript i.e., as C0.
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Step 1 : As ϑ1 > h1 and ϑ2 > h2, at equilibrium X 1 < h1 and X 2 < h2 cannot hold, as ∃i ∈
P and ∃j ∈ N with xi < θi and xj < |θj |, at least, that could obtain a higher refund bonus by
marginally increasing its contribution since
∂R
ti
i
∂xi
> 1 [5, CONDITION 7]. Likewise, any agent with
a positive contribution could gain in utility by marginally decreasing its contribution if X 1 > h1 or
X 2 > h2. Thus, at equilibrium, either X 1 = h1 or X 2 = h2 holds.
Step 2 : Since every Agent i is symmetric in its belief towards the project’s provision, its expected
utility is given by 1/2(θi + Ri)− xi for both the markets. Thus, every Agent i has no incentive to
deviate from its preference. Therefore, p˜si = psi , ∀i ∈ A.
Step 3 : As the refund scheme is decreasing with respect to time t (Proposition 2), Agent i contributes
as soon as it arrives i.e., at time ai.
Step 4 : Let qaip1 be the number of total issued securities at market p1 at time ai, and q
ai
p2
be the
number of total issued securities at market p2 at time ai, with Q
ai = min(qaip1 , q
ai
p2
) for Agent i. Now,
1. For Positive agents: At equilibrium, the best response for an Agent i ∈ P is that contribution
x∗i in market p1 at time ai such that its provisioned utility is not less than not provisioned
utility since it prefers the project to be provisioned and is symmetric in its belief i.e.,
θi − x
∗
i ≥ R
∗
i − x
∗
i
θi ≥ R
∗
i
⇒ x∗i ≤ C0(θi +Q
ai)− C0(Q
ai) ∀i ∈ P
The result follows from [5, Eq. 6]. Based on this x∗i , the number of issued securities changes
by r∗ip1 = C
−1
0 (x
∗
i + C0(q
ai
p1
))− qaip1 in p1, since a positive agent always contributes in p1.
2. For Negative agents: At equilibrium, the best response for an Agent i ∈ N is that contribution
x∗i at time ai in market p2 such that its not provisioned utility is not less than provisioned
utility since it prefers the project to not be provisioned and is symmetric in its belief i.e.,
R∗i − x
∗
i + |θi| ≤ −x
∗
i
R∗i ≤ |θi|
⇒ x∗i ≤ C0(|θi|+Q
ai)− C0(Q
ai) ∀i ∈ N
The result follows from [5, Eq. 6]. Based on this x∗i , the number of issued securities changes
by r∗ip2
= C−10 (x
∗
i + C0(q
ai
p2
))− qaip2 in p2, since a negative agent always contributes in p2.
Step 4 : From Proposition 1, θi ≥ R
∗
i can be written as θi ≥ R
∗
i ≥ r
∗
ip1
; or r∗ip1 ≤ θi ∀i ∈ P. Summing
up ∀i ∈ P, we get the condition for existence of Nash Equilibrium here as, from [5, Eq. 7],
C−10 (h
1 + C0(0)) < ϑ
1.
Similarly for p2, ∀i ∈ N we have,
C−10 (h
2 + C0(0)) < ϑ
2.
Step 5 : For Agent j entering last, if X 1 = h1 or X 2 = h2, then its best response is contributing 0.
If X 1 < h1 and X 2 < h2, irrespective of the total contribution, its provisioned and not provisioned
utility is the same at x∗j , defined in the theorem, and it is best response for Agent j to follow the
equilibrium strategy. With backward induction, by similar reasoning, it is best response for every
agent to follow the equilibrium strategy irrespective of the history of the contributions.
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For Agent j ∈ P(j ∈ P) entering the market such that h1aj < x
∗
j (h
2
aj
< x∗j ), its best response will
be contributing h1aj (h
2
aj
). This is because for the contribution h1aj < x
∗
j (h
2
aj
< x∗j ), its provisioned
utility will be greater than its not provisioned utility. Agent j will also contribute the maximum
contribution, h1aj (h
2
aj
), since its not provisioned utility increases as its contribution increases. There-
fore, contributing an amount less than h1aj (h
2
aj
) will result in a lesser not provisioned utility for the
agent. Thus, these strategies form a set of sub-game perfect equilibria.
Discussion: For PPSN, it can be seen that ϑ = ϑ1−ϑ2. The project is always provisioned if ϑ1 > h1
and ϑ ≥ 0 or is never provisioned if ϑ2 > h2 and ϑ < 0. Here it must be noted that it can happen
that ϑ1 > h1 and ϑ2 > h2 are simultaneously satisfied. In that case, if ϑ1 > ϑ2, the project attains
provision point faster than rejection point and vice-versa.
The significance of this result is that, in PPSN (and PPRN), at equilibrium, the project is
provisioned if the majority prefers it, i.e., only when ϑ ≥ 0. Thus, this methodology allows for
truthful aggregation of private preferences of each agent with respect to public projects.
4 Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs
In this section, we present a General Mechanism which incentivizes agents with asymmetric beliefs
towards the public project’s provision, to contribute towards it. In this section, we restrict our
attention to the case where every agent has a positive valuation towards project’s provision.
The General Mechanism involves two phases: a Belief Phase (BP) and a Contribution Phase
(CP). In BP, each Agent i submits its belief for the provision of the project for which it is allocated
some share (denoted by bi) of the reward calculated through Belief Based Reward (BBR) scheme
described in the next subsection. In CP, each Agent i submits its contribution (xi) to the project
which is dependent on the refund obtained in the BP as well as on the provision point mechanism
deployed for civic crowdfunding.
The mechanism requires two separate bonuses for both the phases, which the PM announces at
the start of the project. Let BB(BC) be the bonus allocated for the BP and the CP, respectively.
Further, let a1i (a
2
i ) be the time at which Agent i arrives to the mechanism for the BP (CP) with
t1i (t
2
i ) as the time at which it reports its belief (contribution). Let the deadline for the BP (CP) be
TB(TC) announced at the start of the project.
Unlike in the case of civic crowdfunding for agents with symmetric beliefs, an asymmetric agent
which has significant belief towards the project getting provisioned or not, may choose to free-ride
and not contribute. Therefore, we introduce a reward scheme that further incentivizes such agent’s
to contribute towards the project.
4.1 Belief Based Reward (BBR)
To quantitatively measure the reward share to be distributed to every contributing agent in the BP,
we use a PPM,M. We consider PPMs which incentivize truthful elicitation of an agent’s belief i.e.,
PPMs which are IC.
Let the score of Agent i dependent on its belief (1/2 ± ǫi) be Mi. Further, let S
ti be the set
consisting of all the agents that have reported their belief including the Agent i, who reports its
belief at time ti. For T
B as the deadline, ST
B
consists of all the agents that have reported their
belief. Let Mi, ∀i ∈ S
TB be the agent scores calculated after the deadline. For,
wi =
Mi∑
j Mj
∀j ∈ Sti ,
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Agent i’s reward in the scheme is,
bi =


wi∑
j wj
×BB ∀j ∈ A+; ∀i ∈ A+
wi∑
j
wj
×BB ∀j ∈ A−; ∀i ∈ A−
(2)
We refer to the reward scheme given by Eq. 2 as Belief Based Reward (BBR). With this, we
show the following proposition:
Proposition 3. BBR is a decreasing function of time.
Proof. From Eq. 2, BBR is inversely proportional to the order in which agents report their beliefs.
Since the arrival of agents is non-decreasing w.r.t. time, BBR is a decreasing function of time.
In addition, BBR is also strongly budget balanced, i.e., in BBR the entire budget is utilized. Note
that, at the end of the mechanism, only one set of agents, either A+ or A−, are rewarded.
RBTS Reward Scheme: In this paper, we use RBTS Mechanism to calculate the mechanism score
Mi for each Agent i. For this, every agent submits its prediction and information report as described
earlier.
In this reward scheme, let fi = 0 denote that Agent i has belief that the project will be provisioned
and fi = 1 denote that Agent i has belief that the project will not be provisioned. Thus, through
each agent’s prediction report, the PM knows whether an agent belongs to the set A+ or the set A−.
We now present Provision Point Mechanism with Refunds for Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs
(PPRx) by plugging PPR refund bonus scheme for the CP.
4.2 Provision Point Mechanism with Refunds for Agents with Asymmet-
ric Beliefs (PPRx)
In this mechanism, we plugin PPR refund bonus scheme for the Contribution Phase.
4.2.1 Agent Utility
The utility for Agent i ∈ A+, in PPRx is as follows,
ui(·) = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi + bi) + IX<h0 ·
((xi
X
)
BC
)
(PPRx-U1)
Similarly, the utility for Agent i ∈ A−, in PPRx are as follows,
ui(·) = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi) + IX<h0 ·
((xi
X
)
BC + bi
)
(PPRx-U2)
4.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We present the equilibrium analysis of PPRx as the following theorem,
Theorem 3. For PPRx, with the utility as given by Eq. PPRx-U1 and Eq. PPRx-U2 ∀i ∈ A,
ϑ + BB ≥ h0 with BB , BC > 0 and Belief Phase reward calculated as per Eq. 3 ∀i ∈ A, a set of
strategies σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
1∗
i , t
2∗
i ),
σ∗i =
{
(0, a1i , T
C) if h0
TC
= 0, else,
(x∗i , a
1
i , T
C) : x∗i ≤
(
k1i θi+k
1
i bi
k2
i
BC+k1
i
h0
)
h0 otherwise
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∀i ∈ A+ and a set of strategies σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
1∗
i , t
2∗
i ),
σ∗i =
{
(0, a1i , T
C) if h0
TC
= 0, else,
(x∗i , a
1
i , T
C) : x∗i ≤
(
k2i θi−k
1
i bi
k1
i
BC+k2
i
h0
)
h0 otherwise
∀i ∈ A−; form a set of equilibrium strategies for the respective set of agents, such that at equilibrium
X = h0 holds.
Proof. In Step 1, we show that the equilibrium contributions are such that at equilibrium X = h0
holds. We prove that every agent reports its belief as soon as it arrives to the Belief Phase in Step
2. Step 3 calculates the equilibrium contributions of every agent. Finally, in Step 4 we give the
conditions for existence of Nash Equilibrium.
Step 1 : At equilibrium, X = h0, since the PM stops the protocol as soon as the provision point
is reached. Further if X < h0, then an agent can increase its utility by contributing more to the
project, and receiving a higher utility since BC > 0. Therefore, the contributions are such that the
market is provisioned at equilibrium.
Step 2 : Since the reward scheme for the Belief Phase is a decreasing function time (Proposition 3),
a rational Agent i would report its belief as soon as it arrives to the phase i.e., at time a1i .
Step 3 : The equilibrium strategy for each agent i ∈ A is such that its provisioned utility is not less
than its not provisioned utility. Now,
1. For agent i ∈ A+:
k1i (θi − xi + bi) ≥ k
2
i
(xi
X
BC
)
⇒ x∗i ≤
(
k1i θi + k
1
i bi
k2iB
C + k1i h
0
)
h0.
Since at equilibrium X = h0.
2. For agent i ∈ A−:
k2i (θi − xi) ≥ k
1
i
(xi
X
BC + bi
)
⇒ x∗i ≤
(
k2i θi − k
1
i bi
k1iB
C + k2i h
0
)
h0.
Since at equilibrium X = h0.
Step 4 :Note that from Eq. PPRx-U1, x∗i ≤ θi+bi ∀i ∈ A
+ and from Eq. PPRx-U2, x∗i ≤ θi ∀i ∈ A
−.
Thus, ∑
i∈A
x∗i ≤
∑
i∈A+
(θi + bi) +
∑
i∈A−
(θi)
∑
i∈A
x∗i ≤ ϑ+B
B.
At equilibrium we have
∑
i∈A x
∗
i = h
0. Therefore,
h0 ≤ ϑ+BB,
is the condition for the existence of Nash Equilibrium.
In the next subsection, we present Provision Point Mechanism with Securities for Agents with
Asymmetric Beliefs (PPSx) by plugging PPS refund bonus scheme for the CP.
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4.3 Provision Point Mechanism with Securities for Agents with Asym-
metric Beliefs (PPSx)
In this mechanism, we plugin PPS refund bonus scheme for the Contribution Phase.
4.3.1 Agent Utility
The utility for Agent i ∈ A+, in PPSx is as follows,
ui(·) = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi + bi) + IX<h0 · (ri − xi) (PPSx-U1)
Similarly, the utility for Agent i ∈ A−, in PPSx is as follows,
ui(·) = IX≥h0 · (θi − xi) + IX<h0 · (ri − xi + bi) (PPSx-U2)
4.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We present the equilibrium analysis of PPSx as the following theorem,
Theorem 4. For PPSx, with the utility as given by Eq. PPSx-U1 and Eq. PPSx-U2, ∀i ∈ A+,
C : R2 → R as the cost function, with C0 : R→ R as the cost function obtained from C by fixing the
number positive outcome securities satisfying [5, CONDITION 7], ϑ + BB ≥ h0 with BB, BC > 0
and Belief Phase reward calculated as per Eq. 2 ∀i ∈ A, a set of strategies σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
1∗
i , t
2∗
i ) in the
set,
σ∗i =
{
(0, a1i , a
2
i ); if h
0
a2
i
= 0, else,
(x∗i , a
1
i , a
2
i ) : x
∗
i ≤ C0(θi + bi + q
a2i )− C0(q
a2i ),
∀i ∈ A+ and a set of strategies σ∗i = (x
∗
i , t
1∗
i , t
2∗
i ) in the set,
σ∗i =
{
(0, a1i , a
2
i ); if h
0
a2
i
= 0, else,
(x∗i , a
1
i , a
2
i ) : x
∗
i ≤ C0(θi − bi + q
a2i )− C0(q
a2i ),
∀i ∈ A−; are sub-game perfect equilibria such that at equilibrium X = h0 holds.
Proof. In Step 1, we show that the equilibrium contributions are such that at equilibrium X = h0
holds. We prove that every agent reports its belief as soon as it arrives to the Belief Phase as
well as contributes as soon as it arrives to the Contribution Phase in Step 2. Step 3 calculates the
equilibrium contributions of every agent. In Step 4, we give the conditions for existence of Nash
Equilibrium. We show that these set of strategies are sub-game perfect in Step 5.
Step 1 : As ϑ + BB ≥ h0, at equilibrium X < h0 cannot hold, as ∃i ∈ A+ with xi < θi + bi or
∃i ∈ A− with xi < θi, at least, that could obtain a higher refund bonus by marginally increasing its
contribution, since
∂r
ti
i
∂xi
> 1 [5, CONDITION 7]. Likewise, any agent with a positive contribution
could gain in utility by marginally decreasing its contribution if X > h0. Thus, at equilibrium
X = h0.
Step 2 : Since the reward scheme for the Belief Phase is a decreasing function of time (Proposition
3), a rational Agent i would report its belief as soon as it arrives to the BP i.e., at time a1i . Also,
since the CP is the PPS mechanism, the best response for any for any agent is also to contribute as
soon as it arrives i.e., at time a2i .
Step 3 : From the utility of Agent i in PPSx (Eq. 4 and Eq. 5), it is clear to see that ∀i ∈ A+,
xi ≤ θi + bi (as a strategic agent will not contribute greater than its valuation and the reward it
received) and ∀i ∈ A−, xi ≤ θi. Also, xi ≥ 0. Further, the equilibrium strategy for each Agent i ∈ A
is such that its provisioned utility is not less than its not provisioned utility. Now,
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1. For Agent i ∈ A+:
k1i (θi + bi − x
∗
i ) ≥ k
2
i (r
∗
i − x
∗
i )
⇒ x∗i ≤
k1i (θi + bi)− k
2
i (r
∗
i )
k1i − k
2
i
.
Thus, the maximum value of x∗i is,
xˆ∗i =
k1i (θi + bi)− k
2
i (r
∗
i )
k1i − k
2
i
From Eq. 4, we have xi ≤ θi + bi, ∀i ∈ A
+. Therefore, the maximum value should also be less
than θi + bi, i.e.,
xˆ∗i ≤ θi + bi ⇒ r
∗
i ≤ θi + bi.
This follows from the value of xˆ∗i defined above. To obtain r
∗
i securities at equilibrium, an Agent
i’s contribution x∗i must be
⇒ x∗i ≤ C0(θi + bi + q
a2i )− C0(q
a2i ) ∀i ∈ A+.
The result follows from [5, Eq. 6], i.e., the securities obtained (r∗i ) are monotonic function of the
contribution (x∗i ).
2. For Agent i ∈ A−:
k1i (r
∗
i − x
∗
i + bi) ≤ k
2
i (θi − x
∗
i ).
Similar to (1) of this step, the equilibrium contribution x∗i becomes
⇒ x∗i ≤ C0(θi − bi + q
a2i )− C0(q
a2i ) ∀i ∈ A−.
This follows from x∗i ≤ θi, ∀i ∈ A
− and [5, Eq. 6].
Step 4 : Note that from Eq. 4, x∗i ≤ θi + bi ∀i ∈ A
+ and from Eq. 5, x∗i ≤ θi ∀i ∈ A
−. Thus,∑
i∈A
x∗i ≤
∑
i∈A+
(θi + bi) +
∑
i∈A−
(θi)
At equilibrium we have
∑
i∈A x
∗
i = h
0. Therefore,
h0 ≤ ϑ+BB,
is the condition for the existence of Nash Equilibrium.
Step 5 : For Agent j entering last, if X = h0, then its best response is contributing 0. If X < h0,
irrespective of the total contribution, its provisioned and not provisioned utility is the same at x∗j ,
defined in the theorem, and it is best response for Agent j to follow the equilibrium strategy. With
backward induction, by similar reasoning, it is best response for every agent to follow the equilibrium
strategy irrespective of the history of the contributions.
For Agent j entering the market such that h0
a2
j
< x∗j , its best response will be contributing h
0
a2
j
as for the contribution h0
a2
j
< x∗j , its provisioned utility will be greater than its not provisioned
utility. Agent j will also contribute the maximum contribution, h0
a2
j
, since its not provisioned utility
increases as its contribution increases. Therefore, contributing an amount less than h0
a2
j
will result in
a lesser not provisioned utility for the agent. Thus, these strategies form a set of sub-game perfect
equilibria.
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4.4 Equilibrium Contribution Analysis
We now compare the equilibrium contribution of both the sets of agents in PPRx and PPSx. Towards
this, let Agent i ∈ A+ and Agent j ∈ A− such that θi = θj , bi = bj , a
2
i = a
2
j and k
1
i = k
1
j (k
1
i+k
2
i = 1).
Agent i’s belief about the project getting provisioned is k1i and Agent j’s k
2
j .
1. For PPRx : The difference in the equilibrium contribution of Agent i ∈ A+ and Agent j ∈ A− as
defined above in PPRx now becomes,
x∗i − x
∗
j =
(
k1i θi + k
1
i bi
k2iB
C + k1i h
0
)
h0 −
(
k2i θi − k
1
i bi
k1iB
C + k2i h
0
)
h0
As the denominator is always positive, in the RHS of the above equation we only consider the
numerator. Observe,
h0(k
1
iB
C + k2i h
0)(k1i θi + k
1
i bi)−
h0(k
2
iB
C + k1i h
0)(k2i θi − k
1
i bi) > 0
as, BCθi((k
1
i )
2 − (k2i )
2) +BCbi((k
1
i )
2 + k1i k
2
i )+
h0bi((k
1
i )
2 + k1i k
2
i ) > 0,
since k1i ≥ k
2
i . Thus, the upper bound of each Agent i ∈ A
+ is always greater than for an Agent
j ∈ A− with the same valuation and belief.
2. For PPSx : For Agent i ∈ A+ and Agent j ∈ A− as defined above, the equilibrium contribution
of Agent i will always be greater than that of Agent j since C0(θi + bi + q
a2i ) > C0(θi − bi + q
a2i )
as bi > 0 and
∂r
ti
i
∂xi
> 1 [5, CONDITION 7].
Thus, for both PPRx and PPSx, the upper bound on the equilibrium contributions ∀i ∈ A+
(with k1i as the belief towards project’s provision) is greater than the upper bound on the equilibrium
contributions ∀i ∈ A− (with k2i as the belief towards project’s provision; k
1
i + k
2
i = 1), for the same
valuation and belief.
This implies that agents with greater belief towards the project’s provision contribute more than
agents with lesser belief towards it. Thus, BBR (Eq. 2 and the utility structure as given by Eqs.
PPRx-U1, PPRx-U2 for PPRx and Eqs. PPSx-U1, PPSx-U2 for PPSx, provides a natural way for
civic crowdfunding with asymmetric agents such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.
In the next section, we discuss the setting up of the markets for all these mechanisms.
5 Discussion
For PPSN (PPRN), the PM is required to set up two independent PPS (PPR) markets. The
provision point for these projects are determined based on the economics of their construction. The
rejection point can be similarly determined. For instance, the rejection point for our garbage dump
yard example could be the cost of constructing the dump yard at a different locality. Another
method for determining the rejection point could be the cost incurred by the government as a result
of the public project not getting provisioned. An instance of this could be the construction of dams.
The cost of not setting up the dam, i.e., the rejection point for the project could be the cost incurred
by the government in providing electricity or water etc. to the nearby areas which they could have
achieved through the dam’s construction. Note that, the amount collected if the project is rejected
is at the discretion of the government.
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The PM should allocate reasonable budget for all these mechanisms. Allocating huge budgets
may not guarantee the provision/rejection of the projects. In such a case, the agents may prefer
to contribute just enough to get substantial refunds. Likewise, allocating insignificant budgets may
prove to not be incentivising enough for agents to contribute to the market.
In PPSN, the cost function, C0, used to allocate the securities must also be same for both
markets. Additional details for setting up the prediction markets as well as the budget can be found
at [5, 6].
5.1 Designing Mechanisms for Asymmetric Agents with Negative Valu-
ation
Civic crowdfunding for agents with information structure consisting of both – their preference and
their belief towards the provision of the project, is not trivial, as it provides an extra dimension for
the agents to manipulate the mechanism. For instance, combining PPSN and PPSx (PPRN and
PPRx) will not suffice. An Agent i ∈ A+ with θi ≥ 0, will always choose to contribute towards the
project not getting provisioned, as it believes that the project will be provisioned anyways, making
it eligible for the additional refund bonus. Likewise, an Agent i ∈ A− with θi < 0 will always
contribute towards the provision of the project. However, an Agent i ∈ A+ with θi < 0 and an
Agent i ∈ A− with θi ≥ 0 will always contribute as per their true preference.
For instance, this intuitive result can be shown as follows, from Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 in PPSN with
BBR as defined in Eq. 3, for an Agent i ∈ A+ with θi ≥ 0, the difference in its expected utility in
contributing in both the markets can be given as,
k1i (θi − xi + bi) + k
2
i (Ri − xi)− k
1
i (θi +Ri − xi + bi)− k
2
i (−xi)
⇒ (k2i − k
1
i ) · (Ri) ≤ 0,
as ∀i ∈ A+, k1i ≥ k
2
i and Ri ≥ 0. Thus, a strategic Agent i ∈ A
+ with θi ≥ 0 will always lie about
its preference by contributing against the provision of the project. Likewise, an Agent i ∈ A− with
θi < 0 will always contribute towards the provision of the project. However, an Agent i ∈ A
+ with
θi < 0 and an Agent i ∈ A
− with θi ≥ 0 will always contribute as per their true preference.
Thus, the general method and the general mechanism proposed in this paper for civic crowd-
funding for agents with negative valuation and agents with asymmetric belief respectively, are not
sufficient to incentivize every asymmetric agent to contribute as per their true preference. This can
be further explored in future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the limitations of existing literature on civic crowdfunding. We showed
that it poses restrictions on the information structure of agents, as it only allows for positive as well
as symmetric agents. We broke this barrier on the information structure of an agent by proposing
(i) a general methodology for addressing symmetric agents with negative preferences based on which
we proposed two mechanisms, PPRN and PPSN (Theorem 2); and (ii) a general mechanism for
positive agents with asymmetric beliefs based on which we proposed two mechanisms, PPRx and
PPSx (Theorem 4).
We leave it for future work to explore the feasibility of combining negative preferences and
asymmetric belief into one framework for civic crowdfunding.
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